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Abstract 
  
Most people in the world live in countries where poor quality of government and corruption are 
a pressing problem. Research also shows that these are issues that citizens are deeply concerned 
about. Yet, questions about quality of government and corruption are largely absent in the tra-
ditional literature on political attitudes and behavior. This dissertation aims to fill some of the 
gaps in the previous literature by exploring how poor public institutions structure political life. 
The dissertation argues that the quality of government crucially affects individuals’ relationship 
to the state and their belief about what can be achieved through the democratic process. The 
results in three individual research papers highlight many of the adverse effects of corruption 
on various political outcomes, where corruption often is associated with widespread political 
resignation. At the same time, the results also show that citizens in settings with high corruption 
at times show strong agency and try to find ways to express themselves politically, despite the 
many obstacles to effective political participation that widespread corruption entails. 
 
 
 
 
Sammanfattning på Svenska
Majoriteten av världens befolkning lever i länder där korruption och dåligt fungerande offent-
liga institutioner är problem som präglar deras vardag. Detta inkluderar även innevånare i stater 
som brukar klassificeras som demokratiska och ekonomiskt utvecklade. Forskning visar att kor-
ruption också är något som människor bryr sig om; flera studier visar att korruption hör till de 
politiska frågor som rankas som viktigast och diskuteras mest världen över. Samtidigt så har 
frågor om samhällsstyrningens kvalitet (quality of government) och korruption i princip varit 
frånvarande i den traditionella forskningslitteraturen om politiska attityder och politiskt bete-
ende. Denna avhandling syftar till att fylla delar av denna forskningslucka genom att studera 
hur dåligt fungerande offentliga institutioner strukturerar människors politiska agerande. Av-
handlingen argumenterar för att samhällsstyrningens kvalitet är en fundamental faktor som for-
mar individers förhållande till staten och deras uppfattning om vad som kan åstadkommas ge-
nom den demokratiska processen. Resultaten från tre fristående forskningsartiklar belyser flera 
negativa effekter av korruption på olika politiska utfall, där korruption ofta är associerat med 
politisk resignation. Samtidigt så visar resultaten att människor som lever i korrupta kontexter 
uppvisar betydande handlingskraft genom att finna nya vägar till politiskt engagemang, trots 
det hinder för effektivt politiskt deltagande som korruption utgör. 
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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
1.1 A study of quality of government and political behavior
In the 2010 Brazilian general elections the professional clown Tiririca became the most-
voted-for congressman and was elected to the national Chamber of Deputies (despite some
uncertainty as to whether Tiririca actually was literate). The clown-congressman was elected
in the wake of several publicized corruption scandals, running on slogans like ‘It can’t get any
worse, vote Tiririca’. After serving 7 years in the Chamber of Deputies, the clown Tiririca
announced in December 2017 that he would not run in the upcoming elections, citing that
he was too embarrassed by the corruption and incompetence among his politician colleagues
(The Economist Dec 14th, 2017).
Most of the world’s countries suffer from corruption and poor quality of government (al-
beit, of course, to different degrees).1 My main claim in this dissertation is that this matters
for political life and for political behavior among citizens, in ways previously overlooked. As
illustrated in the Brazilian example above, big corruption scandals can change the logic of
politics and erode peoples’ trust in politicians and the political system. At the same time,
corruption is also an everyday problem that many citizens face around the world. These
more subtle forms of corruption affect how millions of voters perceive the quality of public
institutions and the efficiency of the state. In the end, this affects how they behave and
think politically.
Traditionally, corruption has not been an important part of the literature on political be-
havior. This is a significant shortcoming. Given that most people in the world - importantly,
including people in mature democracies - live and act in societies where corruption is more or
less an ever-present phenomenon, this variable should be taken seriously when thinking about
how people engage in politics. In this dissertation I identify three themes, based on a broad
reading of previous research, that may serve as a point of departure for researchers thinking
about the relationship between corruption/quality of government (QoG) and political behav-
ior. The themes are, in brief: (1) corruption is something that people are deeply concerned
about, (2) corruption and QoG shape the relationship between the individual and the state,
(3) corruption and QoG affect citizens’ belief about the capacity of the democratic state. The
insights underlying these themes are under-appreciated in the political behavior-literature
and have only recently started to become acknowledged as significant factors shaping indi-
1I define these terms in section 3.1. In short, I use ‘quality of government’ as a general concept that
captures the quality and functioning of public institutions and the degree to which these institutions operate
under the norm of impartiality. I consider ‘corruption’ to be the most important instance of low quality of
government and a strong violation of the norm of impartiality. Corruption in this sense involves a public
official exploiting his or her office for personal gain.
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viduals’ political thinking. I argue that these insights should be incorporated more explicitly
in research on topics such as voting behavior and political accountability.
Starting from these themes, the dissertation explores the relationship between corruption
and political behavior in three individual research papers. The results show that corruption
and quality of government are important variables to consider in models on political attitudes
and participation. The dissertation expands on and contributes to previous work on the
subject by exploring the relationship between corruption and several political outcomes that
are under-researched in this literature, like vote preference and political efficacy. While this
highlights the many adverse effects of corruption on political life, the results also provide a
more complex view of democratic actors in corrupt systems that is an important contribution
to the literature. On the one hand, corruption fosters a sense of political resignation among
citizens, where trust in political institutions and the belief in the capacity of the democratic
state is significantly weakened. On the other hand, the results also provide an important
complementary picture that highlights the agency of citizens in corrupt settings: despite the
many obstacles to effective political engagement that widespread corruption entails, citizens
try to find ways to express themselves politically. When given the opportunity, many voters
will use their democratic power to try to change the system and hold elite political actors
accountable. This hence also highlights the potential of political accountability as a means
to combat corruption and improve the quality of public institutions.
1.2 Background
Before the 1990s researchers paid little attention to the problem of corruption. During the
last decades, however, debates on institutions have reached the center stage of academic
research and with these debates discussions about governance, quality of government (QoG),
and corruption have followed (Rothstein 2011). Today, few scholars of comparative politics
would dispute the importance of these issues when it comes to the functioning of society and
the well-being of its citizens (Fisman and Golden 2017).
Due to its long-time position in the academic periphery, corruption has not been a part
of traditional comparative work on political attitudes and behavior, and only in relatively
recent years have researchers started to acknowledge the profound consequences corruption
can have for the functioning of democracies (Warren 2004). For it is not the case that
corruption is only a problem affecting ‘developing’ countries. Transparency International
estimates that over 80 % of the world’s population live in countries where corruption is
a very serious problem.2 Research shows that startlingly poor public institutions can be
2The statistic is based on the number of countries that scored less than 50 on the Corruption Perception
Index, with 100 being the best possible score.
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found, for instance, at the heart of western Europe, in what many consider among the most
‘developed’ parts of the world (Charron et al. 2013). A growing literature in political science
has, in the light of this, started to ask questions about how differences in institutional quality
shape and structure citizens’ political attitudes and behavior.
While long neglected by academics, the issue of corruption occupies the minds of citizens
around the world. When the World Economic Forum recently surveyed individuals between
18 and 35 from 186 countries around the world about most pressing issues of concern in their
country ‘government accountability and transparency/corruption’ ranked 1st, with 46.9% of
the votes globally (World Economic Forum 2017). Other surveys have shown that corruption
is the political issue most frequently discussed by the public globally, ahead of topics like
extreme poverty, climate change, and terrorism (Holmes 2015). Even in countries where
corruption is very widespread, citizens still view bribe payments and the misuse of public
money as a serious moral wrong that can not be justified (Karklins 2005; Persson et al. 2013;
Rothstein and Varraich 2017). It is hence clear that corruption is not only something that
can be shown to substantially affect the functioning of states in a general sense, but also
something the citizens are deeply concerned about. This, I argue, gives us strong reasons to
consider the political consequences of corruption. We can not fully understand democratic
behavior without understanding how the substantial variation in institutional quality affects
political life. From a research perspective, this opens up an opportunity to add a valuable
contribution to a relatively new (but constantly expanding) research literature. The over-
arching question for this dissertation can thus be summarized as how does corruption/QoG
affect citizens’ political attitudes and behavior?
Questions about how corruption relates to political attitudes and behavior inevitably
brings us to classic themes in political science, like political trust and voting behavior. How-
ever, how corruption is related to these important topics is a largely overlooked topic in
the traditional literature. This is obviously partly a result of the general lack of interest
in corruption that was ubiquitous in academia until relatively recently, and partly a result
of the fact that many influential studies on political behavior and attitudes have mostly
been concerned with ‘low-corruption contexts’ (in a relative sense), like the US or Western
Europe (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Zaller 1992). An in-
teresting exception is the political science classic The Civic Culture by Almond and Verba
(1963). The authors study the democratic system and culture (around the year 1960) by
surveying about 1000 respondents in each of five countries: the United States, the United
Kingdom, Germany, Mexico, and Italy. Mexico and Italy are countries where widespread
corruption was (and still is) a major problem. The authors describe respondents in these
countries as ‘alienated’, believing that the government ought to provide services for them,
3
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but realizing that public institutions are corrupt and responsive only to bribes or family
connections. Many interviewees report resignation and cynicism in the face of local public
officials pocketing tax money and politicians only catering to the needs of the well-connected
(Almond and Verba 1963, pp. 50-51). The authors describe a political culture where a large
number of citizens, partly as a result of this, are ‘parochial’; political sleepwalkers who feel
like strangers in their own society. With slightly more modern terms we might describe these
as citizens with low political efficacy and low political trust. These are themes that I will
return to many times in this dissertation.
Recent years have seen an increased interest in corruption as a phenomenon that af-
fects political life and electoral politics. In a seminal paper Ferraz and Finan (2008) study
the effects on electoral accountability of disclosing information about corruption practices.
Using publicly released audit reports, part of a federal anti-corruption program in Brazil,
the authors show that the corruption information had a significant impact on incumbents’
electoral performance: releasing the reports prior to an election decreased the incumbent’s
likelihood of reelection by 17%. In another study, Chong et al. (2015) randomly assigned
voting precincts to a campaign spreading information on corruption and public expenditure
conducted one week before the 2009 municipal elections in Mexico. The authors find that
corruption information decreased support for the incumbent party, but also that it decreased
support for the challenger party, decreased voter turnout, and eroded partisan attachments.
These two studies show that corruption can have very real consequences for politics and
democratic behavior. At the same time, the studies also suggest that the effects are com-
plex and sometimes unpredictable. Despite the recent growing interest in the relationship
between corruption and political attitudes and behavior, we still have just scratched the
surface; there still exists major research gaps with regard to how, when, and why corruption
affects politics. My hope is that this dissertation will provide a valuable piece to this bur-
geoning research area, and make an important contribution to both the corruption literature
and the literature on comparative political behavior.
2 Theory
2.1 Defining quality of government and corruption
Before delving deeper into the literature on corruption and different aspects of political
behavior I first provide some general definitions.
The academic debate on related concepts like ‘governance’, ‘corruption’, and ‘quality of
government’ reaches back several decades. While much ink has been spilled, there still exists
4
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a number of different definitions and conceptualizations with regard to these terms (Agnafors
2013; Fukuyama 2013, 2016; Rose-Ackerman 1999, 2017; Rothstein and Teorell 2008). The
central goal of this dissertation is not to advance this theoretical debate. However, a few
general definitions are warranted. I use ‘quality of government’ (QoG) as a general concept
that captures the quality and functioning of public institutions. I draw upon the discussion
in Rothstein and Teorell (2008, p. 170) and define high quality of government (or ‘good
government/governance’) as impartiality. In this definition, the principle of impartiality is
a procedural norm where government officials who implement laws or policies do not take
anything into consideration about the citizen that is not stipulated by the law or policy
beforehand. I consider corruption to be a very strong and serious violation of this princi-
ple; Rothstein (2014) has even argued that corruption should be considered the opposite of
impartiality. Corruption can broadly be defined as an act involving a public official who
exploits his or her office to further his or her personal interests - rather than the public’s.3
Corruption, according to this definition, involves things like a politician accepting or extort-
ing cash bribes, assigning contracts to family members (the latter a more indirect form of
‘personal interest’), or engaging in outright theft and embezzlement. It also includes ‘petty’
forms of corruption, where, for instance, bureaucrats or civil servants illegally increase their
salaries by extracting bribes (and thereby violate the norm of impartiality) (Fisman and
Golden 2017, pp. 23-55).
In this sense, ‘quality of government’ is a higher level of abstraction than ‘corruption’. I
find the former term useful when talking about the functioning of societies in a more general
sense. Corruption moves us one step down the ladder of abstraction (Sartori 1970), focusing
on the most important instance of low quality of government. The individual papers in the
dissertation focus on slightly different aspects of QoG and corruption to provide the most
relevant level of operationalization for the specific research question at hand. For instance,
in paper 3 I focus on political corruption specifically, moving one step further down the
ladder by studying a specific type of corruption. Paper 1, on the other hand, uses a much
more general level of operationalization that is closer to the broad concept of QoG. I provide
additional clarifications and definitions when necessary in each individual paper.
2.2 QoG in democratic regimes
Is poor quality of government and corruption a problem in democracies? Certainly, the worst
offenders on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index are not famous for
their civil liberties and democratic freedom; countries like North Korea and Somalia are
3See also https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption
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repeatedly ranked among the most corrupt in the world (Fisman and Golden 2017, ch. 3).
Given that corruption is most commonly associated with poor autocratic regimes, is the
phenomenon an interesting factor to study and consider in democratic contexts?
A common assumption is that democratic institutions is an antidote for corruption. Com-
petitive elections should, in theory, work as a powerful means for aligning policy making with
the public interest. And as convincingly shown by research from recent decades, good gov-
ernment is undeniably in the public interest. Moreover, given citizens’ strong distaste for
corruption, electoral competition should give political candidates a strong incentive to stay
away from corrupt dealings. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to expect relatively well-
functioning democracies to be more or less free from corruption.
Unfortunately, reality is far more complex. Several studies have shown that the relation-
ship between quality of government and level of democracy at the macro-level by no means
is a straightforward linear relationship; more democratic countries are simply not always less
corrupt (Ba¨ck and Hadenius 2008; Charron and Lapuente 2010; Keefer 2007; Sung 2004).
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Figure 1: Corruption and level of democracy. The y-axis displays different countries’ score
on the World Bank’s Control of corruption index. The x-axis shows the score for different countries
on the V-dem’s Polyarchy index, indicating the level of ‘electoral democracy’.
Figure 1 plots the World Bank’s Control of corruption index 4 (y-axis) against the V-dem’s
4Kaufmann et al. (2011)
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Polyarchy index 5 (x-axis). Eyeballing the graph, it is quite remarkable that deeply author-
itarian states, like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, actually perform better in terms of controlling
corruption than democratic states like Italy and Brazil.
The point of departure in this dissertation is that many (even most) democratic countries
suffer from problems with corruption and poor QoG (needless to say, to different degrees).
That is, it is possible for a country to in general adhere to the principles of electoral democracy
- and be classified as a ‘democracy’ in all reasonable categorizations - and still struggle with
poorly working and corrupt public institutions. The group of countries classified as ‘free’ by
the Freedom House6 has an average score of 57 (with a median score of 55) on Transparency
International’s corruption perceptions index7. The index, ranging from 0 (highly corrupt) to
100 (highly clean), thus suggests that many democratic countries are only average performers
when it comes to control of corruption.
Even within the EU, arguably among the most democratic and developed parts of the
world, corruption and low QoG are highly prevalent issues. Charron et al. (2014) notice
great variation in QoG not only between countries in the European Union, but also within
single countries. For instance, most regions in northern Italy perform well in terms of QoG -
almost on par with known high-performers like Denmark. At the same time, several regions
in southern Italy suffer from widespread corruption on a level commonly associated with poor
developing countries. The empirical evidence is thus clear: corruption is a serious problem
in many democracies, and no democratic country (or non-democratic, for that matter) can
claim to be completely ‘corruption-free’. The fact that corruption is a present problem in
most democratic countries gives us strong reasons to consider how this variable relates to
models of democratic behavior among citizens.
How much does a country’s level of corruption matter overall? Early research often
focused on the potential upsides of corruption; as a way of getting around cumbersome and
unnecessary rules and regulation and thereby reducing inefficiencies in the political system
(e.g. Huntington 1968). These ideas have fallen out of fashion in the face of mounting
empirical evidence of how corruption actually affects societies. An emerging consensus is
that the effects of corruption are corrosive, without any side-benefits to society as a whole:
corruption impairs economic growth (Mauro 1995; Rose-Ackerman 1999), increases economic
inequality (Gupta et al. 2007; You and Khagram 2005), creates inefficiencies in public service
delivery (Bardhan 1997; Olken and Pande 2007), and is in general negatively associated to a
wide range of indicators of human welfare (Fisman and Golden 2017; Holmberg and Rothstein
5The index measures the extent to which “... the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense [is]
achieved” (see Coppedge et al. 2016)
6https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018
7https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
7
2 THEORY
2011; Holmberg et al. 2009).
Researchers have also in recent years started to acknowledge the relationship between
poor QoG and the workings of democracy in general. Why should we expect poor QoG and
corruption to be related to aspects of the functioning of democracy specifically? Warren
(2004, 2006) argues that corruption corrodes the meanings and mechanisms of democracy
itself. By breaking the link between collective decision-making and peoples’ power to influ-
ence these decisions, corruption reduces the effective domain of public action and the reach
of democracy. This, according to Warren, violates one of the central principles of democracy,
namely the principle of inclusion - the norm that every individual potentially affected by a
collective decision should have an opportunity to affect the decision proportional to his or her
stake in the outcome (Warren 2006, p. 804). Corruption thus involves unjustifiable exclu-
sion: The corrupt use their control over resources to change public agencies into instruments
of private benefit, at the expense of people excluded from the corrupt transaction. In this
sense, what is corrupted is “government as the trustee and executor of collective purposes”;
a collective agent that people can trust to execute collective decisions. Warren refers to this
as the corruption of democracy by duplicitous exclusion (Warren 2004). When people lose
faith that public decision are taken for reasons that are publicly available and justifiable,
they can be expected to become cynical about politics and passive democratic citizens.
While much research on political attitudes and behavior in democracies traditionally have
focused on factors on the input side of politics, corruption and QoG are better viewed as
factors on the output side (see Easton (1953)). Factors on the input side are related to
the process of translating public opinion to political decisions and the different institutional
arrangements involved in this process. For instance, the traditional literature on the deter-
minants of voter turnout has mostly been focused on individual-level factors, like education,
and institutional input side factors like electoral rules and party systems (see Blais 2006).
Focusing on output side factors implies a slightly different perspective, notably that
the ultimate proof of the pudding must be in the eating. This perspective emphasizes the
importance of what citizens actually get in the end; how policies are implemented, and
the way in which public services are delivered. Needless to say, this is not to claim that
input factors are not important in shaping political attitudes and behavior. Rather, it is the
view that output factors are often at least as important, and that they sometimes can be
absolutely crucial for understanding many important questions in political science.
Building on this discussion about the effect of corruption in democracies I will now briefly
review three topics of central interest to this dissertation, all related to the overall question
about the relationship between corruption and citizens’ political attitudes and behavior: QoG
and trust in democratic institutions, QoG and democratic behavior, and corruption voting.
8
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2.3 QoG and trust in democratic institutions
Questions about QoG and trust in democratic institutions are part of the larger literature on
determinants of system support. In his seminal paper, Easton (1975) distinguishes between
specific and diffuse support. Specific support is directed towards the political authorities
and authoritative institutions, and is therefore closely tied to current regime performance.
For instance, an economic downturn might strongly affect citizens’ specific support when
they perceive that the incumbents have mismanaged the economy. Diffuse support, on the
other hand, tends to be more durable and persistent. This more abstract kind of support
is tied to the political regime as a whole, rather than to specific actors. Easton identifies
two core components of diffuse support: trust and legitimacy. Trust in this sense can be
described as a feeling that the political system would produce preferred outcomes even if left
unattended. Legitimacy is defined as a conviction that it is ‘right and proper’ to accept and
obey authorities in the political sphere, and that these authorities, in some general sense,
conform to citizens’ own moral principles Easton (1975, pp. 447-451).
Research has established a strong empirical link between QoG and diffuse support. Per-
sistent and widespread corruption is closely connected to low trust in the political system
and low faith in democratic institutions. In one of the early studies exploring this link, Selig-
son (2002) conducted a nationally representative survey in four Latin American countries to
test the effect of corruption experiences on belief in the legitimacy of the political system.
The author finds a strong negative relationship in all four countries. In a related study,
Anderson and Tverdova (2003) analyze data from the International Social Survey Program
and find that citizens in countries with higher corruption (as measured with Transparency
International’s CPI index) express more negative evaluations of the political system and ex-
hibit lower trust in civil servants. Similar findings are reported by Wagner et al. (2009) who
analyze how institutional factors affect satisfaction with democracy. Using Eurobarometer
data in a longitudinal study of European countries over the years 1990-2000 the authors
find that high quality institutions like the rule of law and low corruption seem to have a
positive impact on average satisfaction with democracy. Several other studies support this
conclusion; empirically, the link between QoG and trust in democratic institutions is thus
well-established in the literature (see Dahlberg and Holmberg 2014; Dahlberg et al. 2015;
Gilley 2006; Mishler and Rose 2001).
It is easy to see why publicized political corruption scandals might erode citizens’ trust
in the political system. But the empirical evidence suggests that also experience with more
petty forms of corruption (for instance, in everyday encounters with public officials) is related
to political trust and legitimacy. Rothstein (2009, p. 325) argues that this is not surprising:
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It is the absence of corruption, discrimination, and similar violations of the principle of
impartiality in exercising political power that serves to create political legitimacy. The manner
in which public administrations are organized is not just a question of economic rationality and
administrative efficiency. In addition, citizens seem to have strong norms about what to expect
when they encounter government officials that implement public policies. This argument is
built on the fact that citizens generally come into contact with the output side of the political
system - with the administration, that is - far more frequently and intensively than they do
with its input side. Moreover, what happens to them on the output side is often of crucial
importance for their well-being. One could say that the public administration is the political
system - as citizens concretely encounter and experience it.
While most empirical studies of the link between QoG and trust in democratic institutions
are observational studies, I think we have reasons (both empirical and theoretical) to believe
that corruption might be a cause of low diffuse system support. However, we know less
about the consequences of this for the functioning of democracy writ large; for instance,
what implications does the link between QoG and trust in democratic institutions have for
citizens’ democratic behavior?
2.4 QoG and democratic behavior
The most well-studied aspect of democratic behavior in relation to QoG is the association
between corruption and voter turnout. Stockemer et al. (2013) represent the majority view
among these studies arguing that as citizens’ perception of corruption increases, the per-
centage of voters who go to the polls in national legislative elections decreases. The authors
argue (in line with the review in the previous section) that corruption erodes political trust
and lowers citizens’ satisfaction with the functioning of democracy. This creates apathetic
and alienated voters that are unlikely to be engaged in the political process. This finding is
supported by Kostadinova (2003) in a study of voter turnout dynamics in post-communist
Europe, where corruption levels in general are high. In line with this, Simpser (2005) finds
perceived corruption to be negatively related to voter turnout in both democracies and more
autocratic countries. Similar empirical patterns are found in Dahlberg and Solevid (2016),
McCann and Domı´nguez (1998), and Sundstro¨m and Stockemer (2015).
In contrast to this, some studies argue that corruption instead might increase voter
turnout. Given that voters have a strong preference for low corruption and clean govern-
ment, widespread abuse of public office might trigger voters to turn out in greater numbers
and demand accountability. That is, dissatisfaction might generate a demand for change,
which in turn mobilizes citizens to engage in politics (Ezrow and Xezonakis 2014). Studying
gubernatorial elections in US between 1975 and 2005 Escaleras et al. (2012) find evidence
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that corruption raises average voter turnout. In an analysis of elections of county super-
visors in Mississippi Karahan et al. (2006) find that more citizens voted in counties where
supervisor corruption was exposed.
However, as Kostadinova (2009) notes, while corruption initially may mobilize voters
to turn out and throw corrupt politicians out of office, systemic corruption is unlikely to
have this effect. When voters realize that widespread corruption is ‘institutionalized’, and
something that is unlikely to be affected by the democratic process in the short term, they
are instead likely to feel resignation (Bauhr and Grimes 2014). This process will in general
depress voter turnout. As noted in the introduction, decreased levels of turnout is also one
of the main findings in Chong et al. (2015), where the authors randomly assigned voting
precincts to an information campaign about rising levels of corruption.
We know much less about how corruption is related to other forms of political behavior.
In a study of central and eastern European countries Hooghe and Quintelier (2014) find that
corruption and low QoG is negatively associated with both institutionalized political behavior
(like voting) and non-institutionalized political behavior (like protests and demonstrations).
However, there exists no consensus with regard to the dynamics between QoG and these more
unconventional forms of political behavior. Other studies suggest that widespread corruption
instead might increase non-institutionalized political participation (Gingerich 2009; McCann
and Domı´nguez 1998). When institutions are weak, individuals might view protests and
demonstrations as their only way of challenging the status quo and express their discontent
(Machado et al. 2011; Scartascini and Tommasi 2012).
We thus know relatively little about how the political behavior of individuals is shaped
by QoG. While the negative relationship between QoG and voter turnout is relatively well
established, how citizens who actually do vote in a high-corruption context differ from voters
in low-corruption contexts is still an open question. A recent study suggests that questions
like this are worthwhile exploring: Using data from ninety-seven elections, Burlacu (2018)
shows that corruption is negatively related to ideological voting. The author argues that
corruption makes voters consider ideology less in their voting decisions, partly due to dif-
ficulties in identifying parties’ ideological positions in high-corruption contexts, and partly
due to skepticism about parties ability to actually implement their programs when corrup-
tion is widespread. This result is interesting and suggests that corruption might have more
far-reaching consequences for political behavior than previously assumed in the literature.
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2.5 Corruption voting
A related strand of research focuses directly on corruption as an electoral issue; can political
corruption decide elections? To what extent do politicians who engage in corruption get
punished and how do voters weigh such behavior against other issues? This is often referred
to as corruption voting.
As noted above, studies have demonstrated that information about corruption among
politicians can have substantial consequences for electoral outcomes (Ferraz and Finan 2008).
At the same time, many studies have shown that the electoral price paid by politicians in-
volved in corruption scandals often is low (or even zero). This means that corrupt politicians
often get reelected (B˚agenholm 2013; de Sousa and Moriconi 2013; Welch and Hibbing 1997).
This is a surprising finding, given voters’ strong distaste for corruption, and given the fact
that voters view elected representatives as one of the major sources of corruption in society
(Global Corruption Barometer 2017).
Understanding corruption voting is central to understanding how QoG shapes citizens’
political attitudes and behavior. Ferraz and Finan (2008) show that corruption substantially
hurt the incumbent’s prospect for reelection in the 2004 Brazilian municipal elections. They
also estimate that the effect was most pronounced in municipalities where local radio was
present to disseminate the corruption information. Several authors argue that this is the
key to understanding corruption voting; voters might often simply not be aware of corrupt
activities. Actors involved in corrupt dealings have a strong incentive to hide these activities
- they are, after all, illegal - and might try to influence media to not report on corruption.
Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro and Matthew S. Winters have shown, in several survey experiments
conducted in Brazil, that information can play a critical role in voters’ ability to punish
corruption (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2017; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013, 2016). When
given sufficiently specific and credible information about corruption, respondents in their
experiments were unlikely to express support for corrupt politicians. This suggests that
citizens’ lack of information might be an important part of explaining why corrupt politicians
get reelected (see also Chang et al. (2010)).
Yet, evidence also suggests that voters sometimes knowingly support politicians involved
with corruption. Anduiza et al. (2013), argue, based on evidence from a survey experiment
conducted in Spain, that partisan bias can make a voter evaluate the same act as less corrupt
when the accused represents the voter’s preferred party. This might lead voters to excuse
political candidates for corruption, as long as the candidate belongs to the voter’s in-group
(Solaz et al. 2018).
Another argument holds that voters sometimes find it rational to support a corrupt
politician, even in the light of sufficient information about the corrupt act. Rundquist et al.
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(1977) argue that while voters in general have a strong distaste for corruption, they might
still feel that other things outweigh the importance of honesty and integrity in government.
In this sense, voters ‘trade’ corruption for other things they like and prioritize. This might be
things like economic performance and political competence (Choi and Woo 2010; Munoz et al.
2016; Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013), ideology or issue positions (Peters and Welch
1980; Rundquist et al. 1977; Welch and Hibbing 1997), or more tangible benefits like tax
cuts and public projects in the voter’s area (Fernandez-Vazquez et al. 2016; Konstantinidis
and Xezonakis 2013; Manzetti and Wilson 2007).
In sum, there is a very lively ongoing research debate about the reasons for why voters
might tolerate political corruption, and to what extent this occurs. As suggested by the
review above, this is also a research topic where there are still important disagreements
among researchers. The topic is interesting because it says something about the potential of
democracy to improve institutional quality. In theory, free and fair elections give citizens an
opportunity to use their political power to ‘throw the rascals out’, demand accountability,
and improve QoG (Adsera et al. 2003). However, the research on corruption voting tells us
that this relationship of political accountability might be far more complex than democratic
theory predicts.
2.6 Democratic actors in a corrupt system
To return to the overarching question of the dissertation posed in the introduction: how
does corruption/QoG affect citizens’ political attitudes and behavior? The theory section
and the reviews above suggest that there are many potential answers to this question. At
the same time, three themes emerge in studies on QoG and different aspects of politics.
I argue that these themes are a natural point of departure for understanding the role that
QoG and corruption play in shaping political behavior, and that they can help us understand
how a democratic context with high corruption differs from a democratic context with low
corruption.
The first theme is that people care about corruption. Corruption and poor QoG are
very concrete problems affecting millions of citizens in democracies around the world. As
noted above, these are also issues that people discuss and consistently rank among the most
severe problems facing their country (Holmes 2015; World Economic Forum 2017). Even in
countries where corruption is widespread, citizens show a strong distaste for corrupt practices
and view it as something unjustifiable (Karklins 2005; Persson et al. 2013; Rothstein and
Varraich 2017).
The second theme can be summarized as follows: QoG and corruption shape the relation-
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ship between the individual and the democratic state. As shown in the review of the literature
on QoG and trust, high corruption is consistently associated with low trust in democratic
institutions, low political legitimacy, and low satisfaction with the way democracy works.
Consequently, QoG can make or break the individual’s belief that public institutions are fair
and just, and that they will produce preferred outcomes in the long run. In this sense, QoG
is crucial for building the type of diffuse support that is needed for any democratic system
to be durable (Easton 1975). Without QoG, citizens might even question whether a liberal
democratic state is actually superior to other alternatives.
The third theme is related to what can be achieved by politics: QoG and corruption
affect citizens’ belief about the capacity of the democratic state. As Warren (2004) notes,
corruption in part breaks the link between collective decision making and people’s powers to
influence collective decisions through participation in politics. This hence constitutes a form
of disempowerment of the electorate. When people see that policies are implemented in an
arbitrary manner, or that politicians are unjustly influenced by bribes and special interests,
they will lose faith in their own ability to affect society by democratic means, and in the
capacity of the democratic state.
When corruption is high, previous research thus indicates that people feel alienated from
politics and from the policy-making process, with low expectations about what the demo-
cratic state can do for them. These relationships are by now fairly well-established in the
literature. This dissertation will contribute to the literature by going beyond these basic
findings and consider the broader implications of corruption for politics. This involves ex-
ploring several more concrete sub-questions that all are related to the overarching research
question of the dissertation. These include: Q1. How are citizens’ vote choice affected
by the level of corruption in society? Q2. How is corruption related to different forms of
political participation? Q3. When do citizens punish politicians for involvement with cor-
ruption? All these questions point to gaps in the literature. That is not to say that these
questions have not been considered by previous research, but rather that the questions are
under-explored in general and that no consensus has emerged around potential answers. The
first research paper in the dissertation, on QoG and support for populist parties (Agerberg
2017), most directly addresses Q1. Q2 is mainly addressed in the second paper on educa-
tion, corruption, and politics (Agerberg 2019a), whereas the last paper of the dissertation,
on corruption voting and political alternatives (Agerberg 2019b), revolves around Q3. I will
return to these three research questions in the conclusions section.
Studying these questions naturally calls for a comparative approach, where QoG is treated
as a contextual variable. Individuals are in this case thought of as being situated in a
certain context with a certain level of QoG. ‘Context’ might, for instance, be measured
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and conceptualized at the national or regional level in such a model. A complementary
approach is to focus on one specific context and try to think about individual-level variation
in perceived QoG and corruption. For instance, some individuals in a specific region might
have an encounter with public services where they had to pay a bribe, while other individuals
in the same region had no such experience. Or, for some individuals it might be the case that
their favorite political candidate suddenly stand accused of corruption, while the preferred
candidates of other individuals in the same election had no corruption accusation directed
at them.
In his famous model of the political system David Easton described how several factors,
like political input and output, interact to shape political decisions, policy, and public opinion
(Easton 1953). I think this framework is useful to illustrate how I view QoG as a variable
shaping individual political behavior on a general level. In his original model, Easton splits
political inputs into two parts: demands (as expressed by the electorate; for instance by
voting or protesting) and support (which, in turn, can be divided into diffuse and specific
support). The political system responds to political input and generates political output
in terms of policy and political decisions. The political output then interacts with society
and institutions and produces outcomes, i.e. societal changes that citizens experience (the
‘output side’ of politics (Dahlberg and Holmberg 2014; Rothstein 2009)). These outcomes,
in turn, might generate new demands and behavior on the political input side, resulting in
a never-ending cycle. My general argument can be viewed as an extension of this model,
stating that QoG fundamentally shapes the way in which political output translates into
political outcomes. This extended model explains how similar political output (e.g. similar
policies) can have very different effects on the public’s demands and support, depending on
QoG. QoG, as discussed above, refers to the way in which policies are implemented; whether
or not laws or policies are implemented in an impartial manner (Rothstein and Teorell 2008).
That is, corruption in the implementation of policy and the general quality of public services
is expected to influence how political output is translated into political outcomes that in
turn affects the political input stage. All research questions in the dissertation hence revolve
around how QoG influences this feedback relationship.
3 Research design
In this section I will provide a general discussion on the data and methods that are used in
the research papers in the dissertation. A more detailed discussion of the specific data and
methods is provided in the individual articles.
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3.1 Data
Due to the long tradition of survey research in political science, vast swaths of data on polit-
ical attitudes and behavior have been collected and analyzed since more than half a century.
While there of course exist plenty of methodological debates about the operationalization
and measurement of concepts in the study of political behavior, many survey items used
to capture how citizens think and act politically are by now well-established. I will discuss
the specific measures of political attitudes and behavior that I use in more detail in each
individual paper.
On the other hand, measuring corruption (and QoG) is arguably more difficult8 Corrup-
tion researchers face a natural obstacle in that corrupt transactions are illegal and therefore
conducted in secret. Corrupt officials develop intricate methods to hide their shady dealings
from outsiders. A reasonable question is thus whether it is at all possible to obtain mean-
ingful data on the phenomenon? Still, to answer questions about how corruption relates
to politics (and other questions about corruption as well) we need to be able to be able to
measure the concept. Three commonly used methods to try to assess the scale of corruption
are official statistics, perceptual surveys, and experiential surveys (Holmes 2015). Official
statistics might seem like a natural starting point; legal statistics typically report things like
the number of cases where corruption was investigated and prosecuted. However, official
statistics on corruption are notoriously unreliable and problematic. In short, these statistics
say more about the independence of the judiciary than actual levels of corruption. It is often
the case that where corruption is the most widespread, the judiciary is least likely to have
the independence to investigate government officials (Fisman and Golden 2017).
In the light of this, most existing measures of corruption are indirect. To quantify cor-
ruption in this dissertation I mainly rely on indirect measures based on data from perceptual
and experiential surveys. The most frequently cited source on the scale of corruption world-
wide is a perception-based measure compiled by Transparency International (TI) called CPI
(Corruption Perceptions Index). The CPI combines surveys of mainly business people and
experts and their assessments of the level of corruption in a country. Based on these data
TI releases a standardized measure annually that includes most of the world’s countries and
their level of corruption. Other expert-based measures include the V-dem data that rates
countries on a wide range of different aspects like level of democracy, bureaucratic corrup-
tion, and press freedom (Coppedge et al. 2016). Perception-based measures like these are
quite naturally open to criticism: what exactly drives experts’ perception of corruption in a
country? Maybe a big crackdown puts bribery in the headlines, even while actual corruption
8This section discusses the measurement of corruption specifically, while a discussion on the measurement
of QoG more generally can be found in paper 1 (Agerberg 2017).
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is on the decline? Also, these measures only capture the perceptions of certain elite actors
and not the general public.
The last point is particularly important in a dissertation trying to analyze how ordinary
citizens behave politically. To get closer to how the public experience corruption researchers
use experiential surveys. In these, respondents are asked directly about their actual experi-
ence with corruption in society. A typical question is: “Have you or anyone in your household
been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?”. There are, of course, problems with
these kind of surveys as well. For one, admitting to paying a bribe might be sensitive infor-
mation that people are unwilling to disclose. Still, in the 2014 Eurobarometer on corruption
25 percent of Romanians reported that they had been asked to pay a bribe (Eurobarometer
2014). This indicates that many respondents in fact are willing to report their corruption
experiences.
There are hence different pros and cons of using perceptual and experiential surveys
respectively. A reasonable approach is to be flexible and somewhat opportunistic and try to
pick the best measure for the particular study at hand. More importantly, combining and
comparing different measures is a good strategy given the varying strengths and weaknesses
of different methods; a result that holds up under several different measurement approaches
should be viewed as more robust. This is the strategy that I employ in the first two articles
in the dissertation. The specific measures that I use are described in the individual papers.
3.2 Methods
Much empirical research on corruption has been concerned with mapping the relationship
between corruption and different individual and societal outcomes that we care about (like
economic growth and life expectancy). This is valuable research: we need to know the
correlates of corruption and QoG to start to develop theories about, for instance, how to
launch an effective anti-corruption campaign or how much voter turnout decreases when
corruption in society goes up. Improved computing power has made it more feasible to
fit complex statistical models to large datasets, which in turn has facilitated research with
individual-level survey data from multiple countries. In line with this, the first two papers
in the dissertation both make use of large multi-country surveys and different statistical
modeling techniques.
The advantage of this approach is the scope of the studies. Paper 1 covers most countries
in Europe with high-quality data on three different levels: the individual level, the regional
level, and the country-level. Paper 2 involves country-representative samples from 31 differ-
ent democracies. Statistical techniques such as multilevel modeling allows me to estimate
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how different data-levels interact. For instance, in the paper 2 I test how the well-known
association between education and political participation (an individual-level relationship)
is moderated by the level of corruption in society (a country-level variable). The drawback
with this approach is the reliance on observational data. In the absence of a credible natural
experiment this makes causal inference very hard. Strong assumptions are generally needed
if we want to claim that the associations we observe with observational data are in fact
causal. I do not claim that providing any precise causal estimate is the main point of paper
1 or 2. Rather, I think that the robust patterns I observe in the data are interesting in their
own right, especially in the light of previous research. I think the evidence in favor of a
causal interpretation of these patterns should be viewed as suggestive. I elaborate on these
issues in the individual papers.
Paper 3 tackles the issue of causality (with regard to a specific research question) by de-
ploying a survey experiment. Survey experiments have increased in popularity in corruption
research over recent years, primarily in the study of corruption voting (the topic for pa-
per 3).9 The obvious advantage with this method is randomization of treatment assignment
which, in turn, makes causal inference possible (Morgan and Winship 2014). The experiment
can be tailored to answer a specific research question and the data can usually be analyzed
using relatively simple statistical techniques. Big online platforms for ‘survey workers’ have
also significantly decreased the cost of running experimental studies (Berinsky et al. 2012).
There are of course many drawbacks with survey experiments as well, and I discuss some of
these issues in paper 3.
I think paper 3, together with previously mentioned experimental papers, shows that
survey experiments have great potential in corruption research. Moreover, several large
recent projects have designed impressive field experiments to study questions related to
political accountability and corruption (see, for instance, Dunning et al. (2019)). Currently,
experimental research is only a limited part of the research area. To overcome issues of
causality - one of the main challenges for corruption research as of today - I think the use of
these designs need to expand, together with an increased attention to causal identification
in general (Keele 2015).
9Recent examples include Anduiza et al. (2013), Fernandez-Vazquez et al. (2016), Konstantinidis and
Xezonakis (2013), Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2017), and Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2013, 2016).
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4 Papers in Brief
4.1 Paper 1. Failed Expectations: Quality of Government and
Support for Populist Parties in Europe
The first research paper in the dissertation (Agerberg (2017)) is concerned with the question
of how citizens’ vote choice is affected by the level of corruption in society (Q1 ). Previous
research has shown that perceptions of poor QoG is consistently linked to vote abstention
(Kostadinova 2009; Stockemer et al. 2013; Sundstro¨m and Stockemer 2015). However, we
know much less about how perceptions of QoG affect the people who actually do vote. Paper
1 explores one previously under-explored aspect of this question, namely the relationship
between QoG and support for populist parties.
Previous studies connecting corruption to the support for populist parties have mostly
relied on broad national-level corruption measures, like the CPI (Hanley and Sikk 2016; van
Kessel 2015). These studies have not sufficiently theorized the individual-level mechanisms
that drive the relationship, and because of the reliance of national-level measures, previous
research have not accounted for the substantial sub-national variation that exists both with
regard to QoG and populist support. Drawing upon research on the political consequences
of personal experience with state institutions (Kumlin 2004; Rothstein 2009), I propose two
different individual-level mechanisms linking QoG to populist support. First, I argue that
people directly experiencing poorly functioning state institutions are more likely to view
QoG as a salient issue (Klasnja et al. 2016). For these voters, populist parties increase the
supply of political alternatives: using data from B˚agenholm (2013) and the 2014 Chapel Hill
Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015) I show that populist parties are substantially more prone
to politicize corruption. Second, a large body of research has shown that QoG is strongly
negatively related to citizens’ political trust (e.g. Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Dahlberg
and Holmberg 2014; Seligson 2002). Several studies have also linked low political trust to
populist support (e.g. Hooghe et al. 2011; Pauwels 2014). I thus argue that low political
trust resulting from poor experience with state institutions makes citizens more susceptible
to the strong anti-establishment message of populist parties, that directly caters to peoples’
dissatisfaction with how the current political system works.
A large dataset from the Quality of Government institute10 on regional-level perceptions
of QoG allows me to capture European citizens’ perception of QoG in their area, as well as
their party preference. This hence opens up the possibility to disaggregate the relationship
between QoG and populist support, both to the individual and the regional level. In several
10qog.pol.gu.se
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different individual-level models, using a wide range of techniques to account for confounding
variables, I find a robust link between between perceptions of low QoG and intentions to
vote for a populist party (as defined by van Kessel (2015)). Using an aggregated version
of the QoG measure, I also estimate the relationship between regional QoG and the actual
regional vote share of populist parties in recent national elections. The results show that the
variables are strongly related, also at this level of analysis: populist parties are in general
much more successful in regions with poor QoG, even when holding country-level factors
constant.
Paper 1 contributes both to the literature on QoG and to the literature on the support
for populist parties. Where previous studies have linked corruption to low voter turnout, the
results in the paper suggest that low QoG potentially not only affects whether or not people
vote, but also how they vote. With regard to the literature on populism the paper provides
a more nuanced argument for the link between corruption and populist support, suggesting
two plausible micro-mechanisms behind the relationship.
4.2 Paper 2. The Curse of Knowledge? Education, Corruption,
and Politics
The second paper (Agerberg (2019a)) explores the second sub-question stated above: How
is corruption related to different forms of political participation? The paper departs from
one of the most consistent associations in political science: the positive relationship between
individual education and various desirable outcomes, like political participation (Persson
2015). I argue that one largely overlooked factor in the literature is how institutional quality
affects this relationship. Given the substantial variation in QoG that exists both within, and
between, the world’s democracies, this is something that needs to be accounted for to fully
understand the relationship.11
Paper 2 develops the argument that the highly educated are likely to be particularly
affected when institutions are weak. While previous research has shown that the educated
in democracies have have high institutional trust (Curini et al. 2012), high political efficacy
(Jackson 1995), and high rates of political participation (Verba et al. 1995), I argue that
institutional quality should be expected to alter these relationships. Research shows that
citizens with high education in societies with low QoG in general are more well-informed
about deficiencies of public institutions (Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012; Seligson 2002), react
more strongly to corruption (Anduiza et al. 2013), and are likely to have experienced high
exposure to corruption in the system of higher education (Botero et al. 2013). In contexts
11For a related argument about the highly educated in authoritarian regimes, see Croke et al. (2016).
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where corruption is pervasive and policy implementation is distorted by corrupt public of-
ficials (Warren 2004), being highly educated and politically sophisticated will not translate
into high institutional trust and a feeling that one can affect political outcomes by using
established political channels.
The paper distinguishes between self-regarding attitudes, including indicators like inter-
nal political efficacy and political interest, and institutional attitudes, including indicators
like external political efficacy and satisfaction with democracy. In a high-corruption setting,
I argue that the highly educated are strongly negatively affected in their institutional atti-
tudes, and thus likely to feel dissatisfied with the way democracy works and disempowered
with regard to formal political institutions. At the same time, self-regarding attitudes are
not directly connected to the institutional environment, and it will hence often be the case
that the highly educated in a low-QoG environment at the same time feel politically com-
petent (positive self-regarding attitudes), but have low trust in formal institutions (negative
institutional attitudes).
The second part of the argument considers the implications that this has for politi-
cal participation. Given their positive self-regarding attitudes, the highly educated will
still seek to voice their discontent in high-corruption contexts (Botero et al. 2013). How-
ever, given their sense of resignation with regard to formal political institutions (Bauhr
and Grimes 2014), the educated will choose a mode of participation that they perceive to
be effective (Scartascini and Tommasi 2012). Under weak and corrupt institutions, this
means de-emphasizing formal political participation (like voting) and resorting to more un-
conventional, non-institutionalized means of participation (like protests and demonstrations)
(Machado et al. 2011).
Paper 2 tests the empirical implications of this argument by using data from the In-
ternational Social Survey Program (ISSP), covering 31 democratic countries. Using several
different measures of corruption and a range of different modeling techniques, the results
show that while the relationship between education and all different measures of political
attitudes is positive and strong in contexts with low corruption, the strength of the relation-
ship diminishes dramatically in high-corruption contexts, to the point where it even becomes
negative in some cases. With regard to political participation, the results show a strong and
positive relationship between education and all kinds of political participation in contexts
with high-quality institutions. In low-QoG settings, on the other hand, the strong and
positive association between education and voter turnout that has been highlighted in the
literature is absent, while the relationship between education and non-institutionalized forms
of participation is still significant and strongly positive. The results are hence consistent with
the theoretical argument laid out in the paper.
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Building and expanding on the work of Hakhverdian and Mayne (2012), the paper con-
tributes by tying together several research literatures and by providing a more comprehensive
argument about how we should understand the relationship between education and politi-
cal attitudes and behavior in contexts with different institutional quality. By suggesting a
framework for thinking about the complex interrelationship between variables like educa-
tion, corruption, institutional trust, and political participation, while also using new data to
explore the argument, the contribution is both theoretical and empirical.
4.3 Paper 3. The Lesser Evil? Corruption Voting and the Impor-
tance of Clean Alternatives
The third paper in the dissertation (Agerberg (2019b)) starts out from the central question
in the literature on corruption voting: why do corrupt politicians get reelected? The ques-
tion is closely related to the third sub-question in the dissertation; when do citizens punish
politicians for involvement with corruption? The general observation that voters do not
always ‘throw the rascals out’ have puzzled researchers for years (De Vries and Solaz 2017).
Several different explanations have been suggested, most of which are reviewed in the section
on corruption voting above. However, I argue that one critical aspect of corruption voting
is understudied, namely the role of clean political alternatives.
Studies show that citizens have a very strong distaste for corruption and a clear prefer-
ence for clean government, even in societies where corruption is widespread (Karklins 2005;
Persson et al. 2013). Therefore, a simple but crucial question to ask for the voter deciding
whether to vote for a political candidate accused of corruption is: what are the alternatives?
Is there a clean alternative to vote for? Importantly, the decision to vote for a candidate is a
decision to choose this candidate over other available political alternatives and over the op-
tion to abstain. This important fact has not been sufficiently considered in previous research
designs studying corruption voting.
In the paper I develop three hypotheses related to the question of corruption voting and
the role of political alternatives. First, I argue that we should expect voters to overwhelm-
ingly punish a corrupt candidate when a clean and credible alternative is available. This is
in line with voters’ strong anti-corruption preference and consistent with both retrospective
and prospective models of political accountability (Ashworth 2012). Second, drawing upon
the work of Pa˜vao (2015, 2018), I hypothesize that the lack of a clean political alternative
should increase voters’ propensity to select a corrupt candidate. In a situation where all po-
litical alternatives are viewed as corrupt, other considerations will become more salient, and
many voters will hence be willing to consider the ‘least bad’ political alternative (De Vries
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and Solaz 2017). Third, in the latter situation, other parts of the electorate will feel such
a strong aversion to corruption that they will choose to abstain. As noted earlier, the link
between corruption and low voter turnout is a well-established finding in the literature (e.g.
Stockemer et al. 2013).
The paper deploys an experimental design to test these hypotheses empirically. By using
a version of a ‘conjoint experiment’ (Hainmueller et al. 2014), the study models the three
options that are available to a voter when their preferred candidate is accused of corruption:
sticking with the candidate, switching to another political alternative, or abstaining. The
experiment was fielded in Spain to over 2000 respondents. In the experiment the respondent
faces a situation where he or she has to choose between two candidates running for city mayor,
each with six different randomly selected traits and attributes. The study (randomly) puts
a respondent in a situation where either both candidates are clean, a situation where one of
the candidates is accused of corruption, or a situation where both candidates are described
as corrupt. In each specific situation the respondent has the alternative to choose to ‘not
vote’.
The results from the experiment suggest that voters do punish political corruption when a
clean alternative exists, even when the corrupt candidate is very appealing in other respects.
This finding goes partly against studies claiming that voters are willing to accept corruption
if they get things like representation or policy in exchange (e.g. Rundquist et al. 1977). On
the other hand, the results show that while voters in general are prone to punish corruption,
they tend to vote for the ‘least bad alternative’ (one of the corrupt politicians) to a relatively
high degree when both available candidates are corrupt - even when given a convenient
exit option in the form of a ’not vote’ alternative. Finally, and consistent with the third
hypothesis, the results show that both candidates being corrupt is also a strong predictor of
voting abstention.
The main contribution of paper 3 is the novel design that allows me to focus on the
previously understudied question of how the available political alternatives play into voters’
punishment of corruption. While voters are very prone to punish corruption when a clean
alternative exists, the absence of such an alternative leads some voters to become signifi-
cantly more willing to show loyalty to a corrupt candidate. This is consistent with models
emphasizing the increased salience of other dimensions in such a situation (De Vries and
Solaz 2017; Pa˜vao 2018) and citizens’ increased tolerance of corruption in high-corruption
environments (Corbacho et al. 2016). The paper further discusses how these results can
help us understand corruption voting in general, when corruption can be expected to be an
important electoral question, and why some societies seem to be stuck in a high-corruption
equilibrium (Klasnja et al. 2017).
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5 Conclusions
This dissertation centers on the overarching question how does corruption/QoG affect citi-
zens’ political attitudes and behavior? Given the extent of the problem with poor QoG in
democracies around the world, and given the significance citizens attribute to the issue, I
have argued that this question is an important and under-researched topic in political sci-
ence. Based on my reading of previous research I took three themes in the literature as my
point of departure for understanding how QoG influences citizens’ political attitudes and
behavior. The themes are, to reiterate: (1) corruption is something that people are deeply
concerned about, (2) corruption and QoG shape the relationship between the individual and
the state, (3) corruption and QoG affect citizens’ belief about the capacity of the democratic
state. This suggests a model - resembling David Easton’s model of the political system (Eas-
ton 1953) - where political output feeds back into the input side of politics, but where this
feedback mechanism is moderated by the institutional quality.
This reading of the previous research literature initially paints a negative picture of the
political life of citizens in settings with low QoG. The picture is largely consistent with
the findings of Almond and Verba (1963) from almost 60 years ago, where the authors
describe the citizens of highly corrupt societies as cynical, resigned, and ‘parochial’. In
this sense, citizens in such societies can be expected to have low political trust and low
rates of political participation. The results from the three different research papers in this
dissertation partly support this picture. Paper 1 shows how citizens experiencing poorly
working public institutions can turn away from the traditional political establishment and
instead approach more radical populist alternatives. Low trust and confidence in political
institutions make these citizens especially susceptible to rhetoric about the deterioration of
society and promises of an overturn of the traditional political system. Paper 2 shows, even
more clearly, how a high-corruption setting can induce resignation with regard to formal
political institutions, even for citizens usually thought of as the most prone to participate in
politics. In line with this, paper 3 provides evidence that citizens, despite having a strong
preference for clean government, can become more accepting of corruption when they see
that the whole system consists of corrupt actors.
While these findings are in line with the previous literature they also constitute a valuable
contribution. By going beyond the focus on corruption and vote participation paper 1
provides new theoretical and empirical insights into how poor quality of government not only
might affect the decision to participate but also who to support. While there is still much
to be said on the topic, this opens up a clear avenue for future research on how corruption
shapes political preferences. Paper 2 shows that the positive relationship between education
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and different individual-level political variables, often described as one of the most consistent
relationship in political science, is less stable than previously thought. Paper 3 provides a
first experimental test of the notion that a political context permeated by corruption can
make voters more tolerant of corruption (e.g. Pa˜vao (2018)).
At the same time, the results also offer a counter-image to the kind of bleak picture
described above, often found in previous research on QoG and political attitudes and partic-
ipation. The three studies in the dissertation show that voters are reacting to the political
and institutional environment and adjusting their political behavior accordingly. On the one
hand, paper 1 describes dissatisfied and distrusting voters protesting against a corrupt sys-
tem. On the other hand, the paper describes voters turning towards parties that politicize
questions that they care about. In this sense, it is also a story about accountability, where
voters turn away from traditional political actors that they view as incapable of dealing with
the problems that they experience in their day-to-day lives. While paper 2 shows how the ed-
ucated lose trust in formal political institutions in high-corruption contexts, these citizens are
not resigned and disengaged in a general sense. Rather, they look for other, more efficient,
ways of expressing themselves politically by instead relying more on non-institutionalized
political participation. Maybe the strongest finding in paper 3 is that voters do punish cor-
ruption, when given the chance. In fact, I show that respondents are very dismissive of the
corrupt candidate, even when this candidate is politically very close to the voter. Only when
all political options are described as corrupt do the respondents become more accepting of
corruption. This can be viewed as a rational response: when not given the opportunity to
put a clean candidate in office, many voters will opt for the lesser evil and choose based on
other political dimensions. All else equal, it is arguably better to have a candidate in office
that is corrupt but aligns with your policy preferences otherwise, than a candidate that is
both corrupt and whose policy agenda is orthogonal to your political ideals. These are hence
also examples of voters showing agency in difficult situations.
I think this is an important contribution to the previous research literature, depicting
a more nuanced and complex picture of voters and political actors in democracies where
corruption is widespread. While corruption undoubtedly has many adverse effects on people’s
political engagement and trust in political institutions, citizens are by no means only passive
spectators in such settings. Given the strong distaste people around the world show for
corruption, and given the importance people place on the issue, this conclusion - sometimes
too strongly emphasized in previous research - would be too pessimistic. Rather, citizens
often show agency and a strong will to change the system, even though this is undoubtedly
an uphill battle. In a corrupt system the risk is that people start viewing corruption as
the normal state of affairs. Under these conditions, corruption will not be a salient political
25
5 CONCLUSIONS
issue for most voters. What is needed in these contexts is some event that disturbs the
status quo. This can be a wave of protests, a new political actor - like a populist party
politicizing corruption -, or a politician that manages to portray him or herself as the non-
corrupt alternative. When this occurs, voters show very low tolerance for corruption and are
willing to use their political power to demand change.
This has implications for politicians and political parties: the results in the dissertation
suggest that anti-corruption policies and clean government agendas can be viable ways to
attract political support. For instance, when a politician can credibly present him or herself
as a clean alternative, voters are very likely to view this favorably. However, as noted in
paper 3, this is easier said than done in a context where corruption is very widespread and
people’s default belief is that most (if not all) political actors are corrupt (Klasnja et al.
2017).
The dissertation also has important limitations. As discussed above, measuring cor-
ruption is notoriously difficult and each specific measure has its own specific limitations.
We know relatively little about exactly what existing measures are capturing. Country-
level measures, like CPI, are in general compilations of data from many different sources.
Individual-level measures often try to capture a respondent’s perception of corruption with
a limited number of more or less specific survey questions. It is also not obvious exactly how
stated behavior in survey experiment (paper 3) corresponds to real-world behavior (this issue
is further discussed in the paper). Overall, this makes it hard to know to what extent these
measures actually capture the theoretical construct corruption and to what extent these dif-
ferent measures are comparable across societies. My strategy in this dissertation has been
to admit that all measures of corruption are imperfect, and instead try to use many different
measures that when taken together say something useful about the overall concept. Still,
the fact that one of the main variables in the dissertation is hard to capture empirically is
unsatisfying and definitely introduces uncertainty into the studies.
Given the difficulties in measuring the presence of corruption in the first place, it is also
a considerable challenge to quantify the causal effect of corruption in different situations.
Most existing studies on corruption simply do not have a convincing way of doing this. I have
argued that much of this research still can be valuable and important. The first two papers in
the dissertation fall mostly into this category of research, where a precise estimate of a causal
effect is not the main goal. I argue that we need to understand the overarching patterns
in the data to be able to develop theories and to provide a first empirical test of different
hypotheses. Yet, to be able to uncover causal relationships - the kind of relationships that
most interesting theories in political science ultimately are about - we need to complement
these studies with studies based on stronger research designs that put less emphasis on
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statistical modeling and more emphasis on finding plausible exogenous variation in our main
independent variable (Rubin 2008). As discussed earlier, I think survey experiments is one
way in which research on corruption and politics can approach this problem. Recent examples
in the area that use other innovative designs to quantity causal effects include Klasnja (2015)
and Bobonis et al. (2016), relying on quasi-experimental designs, and Corbacho et al. (2016)
and Olken (2007), relying on field experiments.
Despite these limitations, I consider the dissertation a valuable contribution that opens
up several avenues for future research. The results suggest that people in low-QoG societies -
despite the pacifying effect of corruption - under certain conditions will mobilize and demand
change. For instance, paper 3 shows that voters are prone to hold corrupt politicians account-
able when they perceive that they have a clean and credible political alternative. Increased
knowledge about questions like these will help anti-corruption organizations to identify when
a specific message will resonate with the public, and will also help political parties to assess
when politicizing corruption can be an effective electoral strategy. Further exploring when
and why people in some situations mobilize politically in corrupt societies should be one of
the main tasks for future research. Another area of research, where much is still to be done,
is research considering how citizens react politically to different types of corruption. This
dissertation mainly focuses on two broad categories of corruption: personal experience with
bureaucratic corruption, and political corruption scandals. These are obviously heteroge-
neous categories that each contain many different sub-categories of corruption. Exploring
these sub-categories of corruption can help researchers develop more specific theories about
citizens’ political reactions to corruption. For instance, do citizens distinguish between a
bribe paid to a doctor and a bribe paid to get an unjustified advantage (for example paying
a bribe to be able to bend the rules when starting a new business)?12 To answer questions
like these researchers need to develop more refined measures of corruption that are tailored
to a specific end.
Overall, the dissertation shows that there are many important research problems in the
intersection of the study of quality of government and the study of political behavior. As
noted in the introduction, we have yet only scratched the surface with regard to many of
these questions, and many big research gaps are still not addressed. My hope is that this
dissertation can pave the way for future research projects and point political scientists in a
fruitful direction.
12For a theoretical discussion on these issues, see Bauhr (2016).
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